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We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social 
and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets 
with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading 
system provides bridges between lab and field environment that can be exploited to explore 
differences in behavior in the two environments. We find that many sellers do not make use 
of their commitment power as predicted by standard theories of both selfish and social 
behavior. However, a concern for equity strongly affects outcomes and reputation building in 
bilateral bargaining, while buyer competition effectively masks this concern and robustly 
yields equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy of behaviors mirrors observations in laboratory 
research. Furthermore, we find that behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully 
naturally occurring trading patterns in the market. 
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rules and feedback forum; this study is partly motivated by but independent from our 
collaboration with eBay. I. Introduction 
Laboratory experimentation in economics has produced a large and rapidly expanding 
body of research.  One of the important unresolved questions is how to validate lab findings out 
in the field.  What makes this question particularly challenging is that the lab’s most singular 
findings – those where tight laboratory control is most important to clear observation – are 
precisely those that are most difficult to pin down under field conditions.   
This paper reports an experiment performed on eBay to examine whether well known 
laboratory findings concerning fair bilateral bargaining and competitive bidding are robust to a 
natural trading system.  The two field games we examine are more elaborate than their laboratory 
cousins.  Yet as with the laboratory versions, the two field games have similar equilibrium paths 
and outcomes, assuming selfish motives and rational behavior.  In the laboratory versions, 
however, observed behavior in one game is strongly influenced by equity considerations whereas 
behavior in the other game follows the selfish equilibrium closely. The laboratory has been 
instrumental in understanding why behavior differs in games like this because it affords the 
control necessary to separate preferences from factors such as strategic opportunity or cognition.  
The main contributions of our study are two.  First, the results of the experiment speak to 
a current controversy concerning the extent to which behavior under lab conditions mirrors 
behavior under field conditions.  For instance, with regard to social preferences, List (2006, p. 
32) conducted lab and field versions of the gift exchange game and concluded that, “The finding 
that agents behave differently in tightly controlled laboratory experiments than in their naturally 
occurring environment poses an important challenge to laboratory studies that measure individual 
propensities.”  Second, we develop and implement a framework for the systematic vetting of 
laboratory results in field environments.  Experimental economics has a long tradition of 
challenging the robustness of previous findings within the lab setting, including tests of 
artefactual features.
1  The framework we propose extends the principles underlying this tradition, 
in somewhat modified form, to the vetting of results outside the lab. 
Towards a dialogue on how lab and field ecologies differ, Levitt and List (2007) put 
forward a baseline model.  It posits that, along with monetary considerations, human decisions 
are influenced by (1) the presence of moral and ethical considerations; 2) the nature and extent of 
                                                 
1  Much of the first Handbook of Experimental Economics (Kagel and Røth, eds., 1995) was devoted to the 
documentation of these kinds of experiments.  The chapter by Roth on bargaining, games, documents the robustness 
of the laboratory bargaining game results referred to in this paper with respect to stake size, subject pool, and 
experimenter observation effects, among many other factors. 
  1scrutiny of one’s actions by others; 3) the context in which the decision is embedded; 4) self-
selection of the individuals making the decisions; and 5) the stakes of the game.  The authors 
argue that, “Because the lab systematically differs from most naturally occurring environments 
on these dimensions, experiments may not always yield results that are readily generalizable“ (p. 
170). 
2
Our experiment captures the natural circumstances of eBay’s marketplace along all the 
stated dimensions: The transactions take place on eBay’s platform according to all of eBay’s 
naturally evolved rules.  Subjects are experienced traders who self selected themselves into the 
eBay environment for their own, independent purposes (including into their market roles as 
buyers or sellers).  The stakes reflect those of the average transaction on eBay.  As is common in 
many markets, trader behavior on EBay is highly scrutinized, both by other traders and by the 
market management.  EBay permits a trader to post “feedback “ on his experience with another 
trader, open information for all traders when deciding on future trading partners.  Moral and 
ethical considerations are part of these postings.  The actions in our experiment were official 
eBay transactions and became part of these feedback histories.  (We use this information to link 
behavior in the field experiment to behavior in the fully naturally occurring environment.)   
Behind the scenes, eBay management monitors the site for unethical behavior, and this too plays 
a role in our experiment (see below). 
Our test addresses another factor that is a critical differentiator of lab and field ecologies, 
this being complexity.  The laboratory is designed for highly controlled empirical research.   
Institutions, such as trading systems, are typically stripped down to match the parsimony of the 
theory being tested, with the goal of minimizing confounding considerations not accounted for by 
the model.  In contrast, real world trading systems endure because they facilitate trade for profit.  
They are agglomerations of formal and informal rules, norms and heuristics, which together with 
trader experiences, histories and networks, evolve over time.  As such, the natural trading system 
is far more complex than what has been implemented in a laboratory.   
To give an example of system complexity in the present context, eBay’s trading rules 
have the same first mover-second mover format as do ultimatum bargaining games (ex., Güth et 
al. 1982) and simple market games (ex., Roth et al. 1991).  In both eBay and the lab games, first 
movers have a significant advantage in that they have considerable commitment power, able to 
                                                 
2 An earlier version of this paper “What do Laboratory Experiments Tell Us About the Real World?” was debated by 
Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, John List, Charlie Plott, and Alvin Roth in an AEA session 2006 in Boston, chaired by 
Gary Becker.  
  2specify key terms of the deal.  But the eBay platform offers the sellers who set up the trade 
mechanism more options (ex., auction, posted price, etc.) than are typically studied in a 
laboratory, with subsidiary rules serving practical purposes that must be abided by.  EBay is also 
a far noisier trading environment than the lab.  For instance, bidders and sellers may contact each 
other before the offer terminates, computer processing time and connection speed may prevent 
very late bids from being accepted, traders might employ shill-bidding or other fraudulent 
strategies, or they may experience computer, server, health or other problems which can affect 
their trading.  Laboratory studies typically avoid such complexities. 
The important point is that, in checking laboratory results in the field, we need design the 
experiment to account for the added complexity. The design of the present experiment enables us 
to classify the behavior we observe as either in-selfish-equilibrium or in-social-equilibrium or as 
out-of-equilibrium.  One of the findings will be that, contrary to what is often presumed, the level 
of out-of-equilibrium behavior among the self selected traders in the field environment is higher 
than commonly observed in the parallel lab situations with naïve subjects.  Much of this 
difference is attributable to the miscalculations, noise and even malfeasance present in the field 
environment.  We will see that, in the face of this complexity, the robustness of equilibrium 
predictions differs substantially across competitive bidding and bilateral bargaining conditions. 
 
The design of our experiment is guided by three principles.  Each speaks to some facet of 
the complexity issue.  Together, they provide the basis for a dialogue on the robustness of lab 
results to field conditions.  The first two principles extend principles that have long guided the 
vetting the robustness of experiments under fully laboratory conditions: 
Losing control in a controlled way.  Given differences in complexity, it is not in-and-of-
itself surprising if behavior in lab and field differ.  The issue is why they differ.  The null 
hypothesis of our test is that they differ because the equity considerations in the lab versions of 
the experiment fail to the field environment, as suggested by Levitt and List.  A natural 
competing hypothesis, offered by social preference theory, implies that competition in markets 
can mask social preferences, much as cooperation in repeated games can mask selfish preferences.  
By this hypothesis preferences are robust to the field, but may appear to be attenuated in certain 
strategic circumstances (see section II.4).   
EBay’s trading system defines a natural game form that lends itself to separating these 
two hypotheses, so long as we establish the necessary information structure and opportunity costs, 
  3which we do by manipulating the object traded (without bending the natural rules of trade).  As 
we will demonstrate, this loss of control in a controlled way enables a three-way link between 
highly controlled laboratory, partly controlled field and entirely uncontrolled ‘real world’ trading 
patterns.  The results also provide a base for further, systematic study, say of the marginal effect 
of a further loss of control.  Which leads to the second principle: 
A replicable test bed. No single experiment is likely to decide the robustness of social 
preferences in the field.  Field environments that are accessible to many investigators facilitate 
the research dialogue. It took many experiments, performed by many different investigators, to 
vet the robustness of social preferences in bilateral bargaining under fully laboratory conditions 
(see Bolton 1999 for a review).
3  A major reason for this is that the design and data from a single 
experiment almost always leads to new hypotheses about the behavior observed. Easily 
accessible field test beds would permit the method of replicating existing results and testing new 
hypotheses that has proven so productive in the lab, to go forward in the field.  Online markets, 
being widely accessible, are one such set of test beds.  EBay’s markets are popular with a large 
and diverse set of traders, a total 222 million registered users in 33 countries, all in cyberspace.
 4  
The third principle is complementarity.  Given the differences in complexity and the 
proximity to natural phenomena, laboratory and field methodologies have complementary 
strengths.  The problem is how to jointly leverage these strengths.  Our solution is an experiment 
designed as a bridge between polls of lab, field, and fully natural environments.   The design 
picks up on Harrison and List’s (2004) taxonomy of field experiments, classifying them 
depending on their distance between the extreme polls of laboratory and natural environments 
(see section IV for a detailed discussion of related field experiments
5).  Rather than leaping from 
shore-to-shore, a bridge provides a more continuous, smoother transition, and one that can be 
travelled in both directions.        
At one end of the bridge are the laboratory results on bilateral bargaining.  Because the 
natural game form embedded in eBay’s trading system echoes these lab games, we can exploit 
the lab findings in a number of ways.  First, the laboratory tells us what to look for in the field.  
                                                 
3 For reviews of the many experiments in the laboratory bargaining literature see, ex., Roth (1995) and Camerer 
(2003).  For a sample of, and references to, additional work see Andreoni (2003). 
4 For a history of eBay, which touches the early evolution of trading rules and norms, see Cohen (2002). For more 
information on eBay, including statistics on usage, size of company, international breadth etc., see 
http://investor.ebay.com/index.cfm.  For a recent survey on economic eBay research see Ockenfels et al. (2006).  
5  Also see John List’s bibliography of field experiments at http://www.fieldexperiments.com/.  Kagel (1995) 
provides an introduction into laboratory auction studies. 
  4Equity in decision making, as observed in the lab, does not look like equity in its philosophical 
incarnations (ex., Güth et al. 1982, Ochs and Roth 1989).  Social propensities tend to be 
asymmetric – people tend to care more about being treated fairly than treating others fairly – and 
many people are willing to trade-off at least some equity for pecuniary gains (so equity tends to 
be treated as a good, not as an inviolable principle).
6  The lab experiments also delineate the 
limitation of equity’s influence.  Maybe the most important of these results is that it seems to 
vanish from competitive markets, even when the game form is quite similar to ultimatum 
bargaining (ex., Roth et al. 1991).  These observations have given birth to social preference 
theory that – together with the laboratory findings – provides guidance for our basic approach: 
We examine, under parallel field conditions, bilateral bargaining (where theory is divided on 
social preferences) and competitive bidding (where neither theory nor experiment suggests we 
should see any).  This way, we gain better control for effects of complexity than we would if we 
compared field bilateral bargaining solely back to a laboratory treatment.  Second, laboratory 
studies facilitate the interpretation of field behavior because the lab results tell us that fair 
bilateral bargaining results are robust to a host of factors within the lab (see footnote 1).  For 
instance, experimental studies show that fair bilateral bargaining is not an artefact emerging from 
transaction costs in the trading environment, because transaction costs are typically controlled 
away in the laboratory.  This suggests that analogous bargaining patterns in the field are unlikely 
to be fully explained by transaction costs, even though in the field transaction costs are difficult 
to be controlled away.  That is, to the extent we can relate behavior in our field experiment to 
robust laboratory findings, we can be rather confident that the field behavior is part of a more 
general trading inclination (and not just the result of uncontrolled, peculiar factors in the field 
environment), robust to both laboratory and natural trading systems (see section IV). 
At the other end of the bridge, eBay permits us to check for relationships between 
behavior inside the experiment and fully naturally occurring behavior outside the experiment. 
This is possible because eBay provides detailed individual trading histories online.  Furthermore, 
as in many markets, after the price has been determined, and independent of the degree of 
competition in the price discovery phase, all eBay transactions boil down to bilateral ones.  To 
                                                 
6  One of the key techniques used to separate social propensities from other considerations has been close 
manipulation of the options and the information facing bargainers.  These studies show how equity manifests itself in 
predictable ways with regard to both strategy (ex., Forsythe et al. 1994) and information conditions (ex,. Mitzkewitz 
and Nagel 1993, Kagel et al. 1996).  While our field experiment does not address the effect of information, it speaks 
to the effect of strategic options on trading behavior.  
  5facilitate this phase, EBay makes available transaction histories of traders, including reputation, 
via eBay’s feedback forum.  Indeed, transactions in our experiment became part of our traders’ 
official eBay trading histories.  We exploit these links between bilateral exchange in and outside 
the experiment, to test hypotheses suggested by others concerning fully natural eBay trading. 
 
II. Design of the experiment and hypotheses 
We test the robustness of fair bilateral bargaining and competitive bidding using self-
selected traders, trading in their marketplace by the marketplace’s rules.  The entire experiment 
was conducted on eBay’s German market platform.  The experiment offered no explanation of 
the platform’s trading rules: Subjects were simply referred to eBay’s own explanation and 
presentation of the trading formats.  Our traders neither showed up personally nor signed any 
documents or receipts before, during or after the experiment.  Nor did they have to report the data 
to us, this being available on eBay for anyone to download.
7 All communication between traders 
and experimenter was done via the Internet.  Communication was automated, with the exception 
of answers to private questions to the experimenter (see Appendix for all standardized 
communication).  Prior to participating, traders had to confirm on a webpage that they were 
available at time of the experiment, and they had to correctly answer some questions to 
demonstrate basic understanding of the set-up (ex., the number of potential buyers; see 
Appendix).  All game payoffs were wired.  In addition, independent of trading success, sellers 
were paid all eBay transaction fees. 
In total, we recruited 400 experienced eBay traders from student populations at four 
German universities: Bonn, Cologne, Jena and Magdeburg.  The average feedback score in our 
subject population was 89, and the median was 44.
 8   This implies that the average (median) 
subject successfully completed at least 89 (44) eBay transactions as a winning bidder or as a 
seller, and thus has gained considerable experience with eBay’s market platform.  To participate 
a trader had to have a valid eBay account and a feedback score of at least one.  In addition, we 
made sure that the sellers in our experiment had a feedback score of at least 10, and received at 
                                                 
7 However, after the experiment was finished, we sent out a question to selected eBay buyers in order to better 
understand the motives behind their behavior; see section III.3. 
8 The feedback score is the sum of all positive feedbacks received minus the negatives received.  Thus, a feedback 
score of n  implies that the trader must have successfully completed at least n eBay transactions.  Because 
transactions may not end successfully (a seller may find no buyer and a bidder may not win), or successful 
transactions may end without or with negative feedback, the feedback score underestimates the traders’ experience.  
It is, however, often used as a proxy for experience; see, e.g., Roth and Ockenfels (2002). 
  6least one of the feedback points in the role of a seller, guaranteeing some minimum role-specific 
trading experience.
9    
 
II.1 Gaining control on eBay  
While EBay’s trading institutions and options (the rules of the game) are substantially 
more detailed and complex than what is typically implemented in the laboratory, they lend 
themselves to relatively crisp analysis – provided that we gain control over some critical 
theoretical parameters.  To the extent possible, we crafted the controls to mirror the pattern of 
natural activity.  For example, the geographic dispersion of our subjects permitted us to select 
cohorts of traders that are anonymous to one another and unlikely to have a common history or 
future.  This way, our design minimizes repeated game and social interaction effects, which is 
important when interpreting motivations behind behavior.
10  At the same time, this geographic 
dispersion – and associated one shot trading – mirrors the norm on eBay (e.g., Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002). 
Another important control is induced valuations (Smith 1982), permitting a clear 
interpretation of agents’ pecuniary incentives.  We did this by creating tradable “certificates” that 
had specific values to specific traders, which control the opportunity costs associated with a trade.  
Induced values were chosen such that the equilibrium prices in the experiment roughly match 
average prices on eBay.  The equilibrium price in both treatments will be about 20 € (see section 
II.4), or about $24 at the time of the experiment.  According to eBay, in 2005 (when we 
conducted our experiment), about 72 million active eBay users generated a gross merchandise 
volume of $44.30b in 1.88b listings, yielding an average price of $23.56.
11
We also made buyer and seller valuations and the degree of competition (that is, the 
number of buyers with positive valuations for a given certificate) a matter of public knowledge.  
This removed any ambiguity in theoretical predictions originating from uncontrolled risk 
preferences.  At the same time, it aligns our setting with a large class of well-known laboratory 
bargaining and price competition games with publicly known valuations (section II.4), and thus 
allows us to link our results back to lab phenomena.  On eBay, the distributions of valuations and 
                                                 
9 By the rules of eBay Germany, a seller can only choose the BIN format if he has at least 10 positive feedback 
points, so that this restriction also made sure that all sellers had the same offer formats available 
(http://pages.ebay.de/help/sell/fixedprice-faq.html). 
10 This is not to imply that we controlled all possible communication between subjects.  Losing some control is 
inevitable when moving from lab to field environment.  Still, eBay allows us to minimize some of the loss. 
11  See http://investor.ebay.com/downloads/fund_Metrics.pdf. 
  7number of bidders likely vary widely, given the wide array of goods and trader sub-populations 
on the platform.  For instance, the number of bidders in eBay auctions follows a power law 
distribution, which implies that if there are bidders at all, one-bidder interaction is the most likely 
scenario (e.g., Yang et al. 2003).  For eBay Germany, where our experiment took place, Namazi 
and Schadschneider (2006) found that about 8 percent of all eBay auctions have exactly one 
bidder.  Our experimental conditions capture simple scenarios, differing by number of bidders 
(one or multiple).   
 
II.2 Bilateral trading environment 
The experiment involves a bilateral trading environment and a competitive trading 
environment.  In each encounter of the bilateral trading environment (BT), one seller and one 
buyer met to transact a single certificate, with a value of zero to the seller and 20 € to the buyer.   
Each participant was invited to engage in exactly one trading encounter.  All this information was 
part of the general instructions sent out to all traders participating in the BT treatment. 
EBay rules require that the seller first chooses a trading format along with a price offer.  
The trading format can be an auction, buy-it-now (BIN), which is essentially a posted price, or a 
combined auction plus BIN.
12  The price offer is a start price if the seller chooses the auction 
format, a fixed price if the BIN format, or both if the hybrid format.  If the seller chooses the 
auction format, a buyer can start bidding in an open, dynamic second-price auction.
13  In case of 
a “buy-it-now” offer, a buyer can accept the fixed-price specified by the seller.  Sellers are also 
free to choose the duration of the offer, from 3 to maximally 10 days.  By eBay’s rules, however, 
all offers must end at a publicly known and predetermined time.   
Altogether, there were 50 buyer-seller pairs involving 100 participants.  The start time 
was restricted in order to insure that offers were made independently (Monday, 10/10/2005, 3pm).  
No offer could be submitted after this time; in particular, sellers were not allowed to submit a 
                                                 
12 In the latter case, a buyer who chooses the BIN-option ends the auction immediately.  If, however, the first buyer 
submits an auction bid, the BIN-option disappears and the auction proceeds normally.  About one third of all eBay 
transactions were completed via BIN-offers in 2005, the rest via auctions.  At the time of our experiment, eBay’s 
“best-offer” format already available in the U.S. (which allows ‘hidden’ negotiations) was not available in Germany. 
13 More specifically, eBay asks the bidders to submit maximum bids (called “proxy bids”) and explains that "eBay 
will bid incrementally on your behalf up to your maximum bid, which is kept secret from other eBay users."  That is, 
once a bidder submits his (proxy) bid, eBay displays the currently winning bid as the minimum increment above the 
previous high proxy bid or, in case there is only one bidder, equal to the auction start price.  At the end of the auction, 
the bidder who submitted the highest bid wins the auctioned item and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid 
plus the minimum increment. See eBay.com or eBay.de for more details and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for a 
description of eBay’s auction rules from an auction theoretic perspective.   
  8second offer in case the first one did not end in a transaction.  Also, sellers were told to post their 
offers under a specific eBay category, and to use a specified item description, both in order to 
suppress tacit and explicit communication between traders (known to have an effect in lab 
studies).
14  Finally, sellers were not allowed to use any marketing options, such as bold font, 
highlight etc., or to ask for shipping or handling costs.      
Once the seller informed the experimenter about the offer identity number, we checked if 
everything was in line with the rules and only then did we inform a randomly selected buyer from 
a different university population about the offer identity number (so the buyer could not 
communicate with the seller prior to the offer posting).  The buyer could then accept the offer by 
bidding (at least) the start price in the auction or by accepting the BIN-offer, respectively.  If the 
buyer chooses to let the offer time expire without accepting the price offer, both buyer and seller 
end up with zero payoffs.  While BT roughly resembles laboratory bilateral bargaining games 
such as the ultimatum game, it differs in many important respects.  First of all, the eBay seller has 
more options than typically allotted a first mover in a laboratory bargaining game.  Also, unlike 
in laboratory bargaining games, we did not explicitly point buyers to the option of ‘rejecting’ an 
offer – they were simply told to be free to take any action as long as it is in line with eBay’s 
trading rules.  Other differences include that buyers were free to choose the timing of their bids; 
other traders (without induced valuations for the ‘certificate’, including shill bidders) can submit 
bids; traders could in principle contact each other (though, we do not know of any such instance); 
they could see the opponents’ reputation, and, if the offer is accepted, leave feedback on each 
other.  All of these features can have and some do have implications for the theoretical analysis 
and the actual trading behavior, as demonstrated in sections II.4 and III. 
 
II.3 Competitive trading environment  
In the competitive trading environment (CT) one seller met 9 buyers to transact one 
trading certificate.  As in BT, the value of the certificate to the seller was zero, while the value to 
each buyer was 20 €.  The game resembles various forms of laboratory price competition games, 
                                                 
14 The eBay category was “Sammeln & Seltenes > Technik & Geräte > Wissenschaft & Medizin > Sonstige.” 
(“Collectibles > Technology & Tools > Science & Medicine > Miscellaneous”).  Translated from German, the item 
description was: “This offer is placed as a part of a research project.  The certificate is only valuable to you when you 
are registered as a participant of the project and are informed about the article number of this offer.  Please refrain 
from asking the seller questions.”  The last sentence was included because an earlier, separate study indicated that 
sellers were frequently asked questions by non-participants about the nature and goals of the research.  It may also 
have contributed to minimize buyer-seller interaction after the offer went online.   
  9but it too differs from the laboratory settings in important ways.  First of all, typical laboratory 
Bertrand games (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, Roth et al. 1991) and laboratory second-
price auctions (see Kagel 1995 for a survey) involve sealed bidding, while eBay involves open 
bidding, allowing the possibility of coordinated bidding (section II.4).  Also, in laboratory price 
competition among buyers, sellers typically do not assume any active role.  However, on eBay, 
sellers choose formats and price-offers, which turn out to be theoretically and behaviorally 
relevant (section II.4).  Another difference is that the “market game” by Roth et al. (1991) allows 
the seller to reject the best offer, while the best offer on eBay automatically establishes a binding 
contract. 
Altogether, there were 30 markets (300 subjects).  Each participant was invited to engage 
in exactly one trading encounter.  No subject participated in the bilateral trading encounters.  In 
each market, bidders were recruited from all four subject populations.  All offers started on 
Monday, 11/14/2005 at 3pm.  Everything else was as in the bilateral trading environment. 
 
II.4 Theory and hypotheses 
Our two central hypotheses differ regarding the extent of advantage seller gain from their 
commitment power across BT and CT environments.  The null hypothesis (selfish equilibrium) is 
derived under the assumption that traders in the market act to maximize their pecuniary gains.  
The alternative hypothesis (social equilibrium) is derived under the assumption that traders 
maximize social preferences, as often supported in laboratory environments.  In all cases, the 
solution concept is perfect Bayesian, which reduces to perfect equilibrium when we assume 
selfish preferences (since then games are fully complete information). 
  EBay requires sellers to stipulate an initial price offer either in the form of a start price for 
the auction or a BIN price (or both).  The price offer is known to all potential buyers, because we 
chose an eBay category that does not allow a hidden reserve price in auctions.  Moreover, the 
price-offer is a credible commitment, because when trade fails to be executed, sellers were not 
allowed to start a second offering.  This was known to all traders.  Thus, in perfect equilibrium 
assuming standard pecuniary preferences, the seller is able to claim the entire surplus in either 
game regardless of the degree of competition.  In both treatments, BT and CT, the seller chooses 
either a BIN-offer of 20 €, or an auction offer with a start price of 20 €.  In case a seller chooses 
  10the hybrid offer-format, both the auction start price and the BIN-offer must be 20 €.
15  In perfect 
equilibrium, all offers must be accepted by (at least one) buyer.   
One might think that bidding in CT will always end at prices equal (or close) to 20 €, 
independent of the start price, so that the competitive equilibrium outcome we characterize for 
CT is robust against the auction start price.  In fact, there is also an equilibrium in CT with a low 
start price and at least two bidders bidding their full values.  However, because of eBay’s 
dynamics, a low start price would allow bidders to coordinate on low-price equilibria.  To see 
why, observe first that in Ockenfels and Roth’s (2006) model of eBay’s private-value second-
price auction environment, which exactly matches our CT condition, all bidders will ‘sooner or 
later’ bid their values in any equilibrium in undominated strategies.
16  In particular, there are ‘late 
bidding equilibria’, in which all buyers bid values in the closing seconds of the auction.
17  
Because late bids run the risk of not being successfully transmitted to eBay, however, it can 
happen with positive probability that no bids come through, which implies zero revenues, or that 
only one bid comes through, which because of eBay’s second-price rule implies that the auction 
revenue is equal to the auction start price.
18  That is, even when all bidders bid value, if they 
delay bidding until the bid risks not being accepted, revenue may be small.  Furthermore, there 
are also ‘early bidding equilibria’, in which the first bidder who sees the auction bids his value, 
20 € (or more), and then no one else bothers to bid because later bids can only win at a price 
above value (related equilibria also exist in Vickrey’s sealed-bid second-price auction).  While 
not bidding is a weakly dominated strategy (Ockenfels and Roth 2006), the early bidding 
equilibrium appears a plausible alternative in our setting.  For one, eBay’s dynamics allow a 
‘natural’ way of selecting a winner based on the timing of bids. Second, because it is publicly 
known that all values are identical, all traders know that competitive strategies imply zero payoffs.   
                                                 
15 Strictly speaking, of course, an offer of 20 € makes the buyer indifferent and thus may be rejected, in which case 
the equilibrium price in our experiment is 19.99 €.  Also, if buyers require more than one cent to break the 
indifference, an alternative null hypothesis would be that the seller payoff is smaller than 19.99 € – but the same in 
bilateral and competitive trading.  (As we will see, both hypotheses will be rejected.)  For simplicity of exposition, 
however, we drop equilibria with 20 – epsilon € payoffs for the rest of this theory section.  We will come back to 
such equilibria in the data section. 
16 A strategy that calls for bidding above value is dominated.   
17 Late bidding equilibria could in principle also exist in the bilateral trading environment.  At the time of the 
experiment, eBay allowed sellers in certain categories to lower one’s start price as long as no bid has been submitted. 
This creates incentives for buyers, when no BIN-price is offered, to delay the bid until very late, when there is a 
positive probability of conflict, in the hope that the seller will revise his minimum demand (e.g., Ma and Manove 
1993; see also Roth et al. 1988).  However, in the categories chosen for the experiment, this option was not available. 
18 In the model of Ockenfels and Roth, the equilibrium is stabilized by the threat that any ‘early’ bid immediately 
triggers a price war in which all bidders bid their values early.  Because bidding value early is also an equilibrium 
strategy, this threat is credible.  See Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for the details. 
  11All this said, in the face of uncertainty about the bidders’ willingness and ability to 
coordinate on low price equilibria, sellers can avoid low revenues by choosing a start price equal 
to the bidders’ valuation.   
The foregoing discussion gives rise to our null hypothesis: Independent of the treatment, 
sellers are indifferent between the BIN-format, the auction format and the hybrid format.   
However, even when sellers choose the auction format in CT, they do not rely on buyer 
competition: All start- and BIN-prices are equal to the buyer valuations (20 €).  All buyers are 
willing to accept the proposed price. 
 
  We next turn to examine behavior under the assumption that traders are willing to trade-
off some of their pecuniary payoff for increased relative payoff (they have social preferences).  
As a result, inequitable offers in the BT treatment will not be accepted by buyers who prefer the 
equitable allocation that results if the offer is not accepted.  For instance, in the models by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), an offer of 20 € is never accepted because 
rejection does not reduce pecuniary payoffs but strictly increases relative payoffs.
19  Both models 
postulate that there is a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to how players trade-off 
pecuniary and relative payoffs.  While equal splits are always accepted, more inequitable offers 
are associated with a higher probability of not being accepted.  As a consequence, in perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, the BT-sellers’ average price offer (or start price) is smaller than what is 
predicted by the null hypothesis, and because of incomplete information about buyer preferences, 
there is a positive probability that ‘unfair’ offers are rejected. (The formal proof is similar to the 
proof of Statement 2 in Bolton and Ockenfels 2000.) 
For the analysis of the impact of social preferences in CT, let us start by assuming that the 
seller wants to maximize pecuniary revenues (the asymmetric social preferences in Bolton’s 1991 
model yields equivalent results without additional assumptions on seller motives).  Due to the 
heterogeneity of bidder preferences, the probability that at least one out of nine bidders is willing 
to accept a given (unequal) price offer is higher than the probability that a single bidder accepts a 
given offer.  Thus, competition in CT allows the seller to make more aggressive fixed price offers 
than in BT.  Nevertheless, the equilibrium price offer of 20 € under the null hypothesis is not a 
reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium offer with social preferences.  The reason is that 
                                                 
19 We take these models as examples, because since they are outcome-oriented, they tend to be simpler than models 
of reciprocity that are based psychological game theory, such as Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004).  However, in our context, most these models seem to yield qualitatively similar predictions.   
  12acceptance of the offer by bidding 20 € is weakly dominated by not bidding at all (rejection): If 
nobody accepts the 20 €, the outcome is equitable (all market participants receive zero payoffs), 
and if one or more buyers accept, all buyers still receive zero pecuniary but now inequitable 
payoffs.
20   
Yet, by running an auction instead of offering a fixed price, a CT-seller can, in social 
equilibrium, exploit buyer competition to push the price up to 20 €.  The trick is to choose an 
auction start price that, if it were the final price, would be acceptable to bidders, independent of 
their strength of concern for relative payoffs.  In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), for 
instance, a price of 18 € would yield a payoff of 2 € to the buyer, which is equitable and thus 
acceptable to all bidders.
21  But once the offer is accepted, the bidders’ behavior is identical to 
the behavior of selfish traders.  The reason is that a buyer is better off – both in terms of relative 
and pecuniary payoffs – competing and winning than not competing and allowing another buyer 
to make the trade.  That is, the pursuit of absolute and relative payoffs is perfectly aligned so that 
competition makes buyers to behave as if they are selfish.
22  As a consequence, in the auction 
case with an 18 € reservation price, all buyers choosing undominated strategies will sooner or 
later bid values:  If nobody else bids, a bid of 20 € yields a fair payoff of 2 €.  If other bidders 
submit bids, a bid of 20 € makes sure that the bidder can get at least some share of the cake 
whenever possible; that is, whenever other bidders’ bids are sufficiently low.  (The formal proof 
is similar to the proof of Statement 9b in Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 and to the models in 
Ockenfels and Roth 2006.) 
So, social preference models imply a rationale for why sellers may want to choose an 
auction with a start price below valuations, even when valuations are common knowledge.  While 
a start price below valuations risks low revenues through early or late bidding strategies,
23 
                                                 
20 Bidding above 20 € is also a weakly dominated strategy. 
21An offer of 2 € is equitable in the Bolton and Ockenfels model because it is the share the buyer would get if the 
efficiency gain from trade is equally distributed among all market participants (see Bolton and Ockenfels 1998 for an 
illustration in a laboratory 3-person bargaining game).  If one applies other fairness norms or uses a different 
definition of the reference group, other payoffs may be interpreted as fair (see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels 2005 and 
2006 for discussions of different reference points for equity). 
22  Suppose a trader’s utility is increasing in one’s pecuniary payoff but also depends on a relative payoff component.  
The relative payoff is defined as one’s share of the total payoff of all involved n traders, and is equal to 1/n in case all 
traders get zero payoffs.  Now suppose that utility is increasing in relative payoffs as long as the relative payoff is 
smaller than 1/n.  Then, losing in the competitive trading environment means that others will share the surplus, 
implying the worst possible outcome: zero pecuniary and zero relative payoffs.   
23 For the early-bidding equilibrium with social preferences, for instance, observe that an early bid of 20 € by another 
bidder implies zero pecuniary payoffs and zero relative payoffs regardless of one’s own bid (as long as it does not 
lead to negative payoffs), so that the incentive to compete against a 20 €-bid is weak – as it is with standard selfish 
preferences. 
  13demanding the whole cake is (unlike in the scenario with selfish preferences) no resort in models 
with social preferences.  Fair-minded buyers have good reasons to reject very greedy offers, but 
even fair-minded bidders dissipate all buyer rents in an auction once they get locked into 
competition.   
If, on the other hand, the seller is fair-minded, he may want to trade at a price well below 
20 €, so that sellers and buyers get on average more equitable payoffs.  The exact offer then 
depends on the trade-off between equity and selfish concerns of the seller, and on the nature of 
these equity concerns in favourable relative situations.  The trade-off and the nature of the 
concerns differ across models.
24  We will come back to this issue in the data section.  What is 
suggested by our framework, however, is that if sellers are willing to sacrifice revenue out of 
equity concerns, they should not do so via the auction format, because they could then lose 
control over their share of the efficiency gain from trade (which depends on bidders’ willingness 
and ability to choose competitive or collusive bidding strategies). 
This discussion gives rise to our alternative hypothesis: In BT, the sellers’ average price 
offer is smaller than what is predicted by the null hypothesis, and greedier price offers run a 
higher risk of being rejected.  In CT, selfish sellers can exploit buyer competition in an auction to 
push up the price; too greedy BIN-offers may get rejected, but CT-auctions with more than one 
active bidder reach a final price of 20 €.  The auction start price, then, can be below 20 €, but (in 
the Bolton and Ockenfels model) not below 18 €.  Fair-minded sellers, on the other hand, may 
choose price-offers below 18 €, but should then prefer the BIN-format. 
 
III. Trading behavior 
  We first investigate seller behavior in both treatments, and then separately analyze buyer 
behavior in competitive and bilateral trading environments.  Section III.4 discusses the effect of 
social concerns on reputation building via eBay’s feedback forum, after a successful trade.  
  As with lab experiments, we had some ‘no-shows’:  In the bilateral trading environment, 4 
(out of 50) sellers did not submit an offer to eBay.   In the competitive trading environment, 1 
                                                 
24 Bolton (1991), for instance, postulates that traders do not care about equity when they are in a favoured situation.  
As a consequence, CT-sellers in Bolton’s model, who are in a favoured position, behave just like sellers in the 
standard model and maximize their revenues as assumed in the discussion above.  The models by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are consistent with price-offers well below 20 € but differ with respect to 
the formulation of equity reference point; in Fehr and Schmidt traders evaluate their payoffs in comparison to each 
other trader, whereas in Bolton and Ockenfels traders only care about their relative status with respect to the whole 
reference group.  Social utility models based on psychological game theory also differ with respect to equity 
reference points.   
  14(out of 30) sellers did not submit an offer.  Analyses are based on the remaining observations.  
Analyses of payoffs and revenues are net of eBay’s fees, which were paid by the experimenter. 
 
III.1 Seller behavior: format choice and price offer  
 
Table 1.  Tabulation of offer channel selected by sellers 
  auction BIN  (buy-it-now)  auction with BIN-
option  Total 
BT 12  16  18  46 
CT 17  1  11  29 
 
  Table 1 tabulates the choices of the offer channels and shows that the sellers’ choices 
depend on the treatment (chi-square, p = 0.002).  More specifically, when we neglect the hybrid 
format, there is a slight but not significant tendency to use a fixed price format in the bilateral 
trading environment BT (binomial, p = 0.572), while there is a strong and highly significant 
tendency to make use of competitive bidding in the competitive environment CT (p < 0.001).  
While this pattern of format choice is not suggested by standard theory, it is suggested by social 
preference theory.  In social preference theory, there is no reason to prefer one or the other format 
in BT, but buyer competition in CT-auctions can avoid problems associated with buyer resistance 
to accept high price offers (see section II.4).   
  The format choice is also affected by a seller’s trading experience that evolved in the field, 
outside of the experiment.  After the experiment, on 12/12/2005, we downloaded transaction data 
of our subjects available on eBay. This data on trading histories include all transaction data if the 
transaction took place not earlier than 9/9/2005 and when the transaction partner left feedback 
(on eBay Germany, other data was not available).  The history data show that those BT-sellers 
who chose the auction (BIN) format have a significantly higher probability of choosing an 
auction (BIN) in non-experimental eBay encounters (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.028 for 
the auction and 0.000 for the BIN format; the corresponding effect for auction plus BIN-option is 
with p = 0.286 not significant).  Analogous effects hold for CT-sellers (p-values are 0.003, 0.014, 
and 0.009).  This demonstrates that the trading strategies in our experimental setting mirror the 
sellers’ individual experiences gained on eBay in naturally occurring encounters. 
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Figure 1 shows the initial price offers posted by sellers in bilateral and competitive 
trading.
25  For the instances in which the seller chooses the hybrid format involving an auction 
start price and a fixed price, we define the price offer as the minimum of the two, which by eBay 
rules, must be the auction start price.  Overall, only a single price offer is consistent with selfish 
equilibrium (19.99 or 20 €).  The modal offer is 10 €, the equal split, in BT and 1 €, the default 
start price on eBay, in CT.
26  Thus, price offers are inconsistent with our null hypothesis.  
Social equilibrium is in principle consistent with the offers strictly below 20 € in both BT 
and CT.  Nevertheless, the theory is inconsistent with a non-negligible number of price offers (13, 
28 percent) below the equal split in BT.
27  These offers are out-of-equilibrium regardless of the 
model.  We made every effort to make sure sellers understood there would be only one potential 
buyer (see questionnaire in Appendix).  For this reason it appears that at least some of these 
sellers did not know from their previous experience on eBay how to handle the lack of 
competition in BT, perhaps not knowing how to handle the full array of tools available to them.  
This view is supported by a closer look at these traders’ background as reflected in our history 
data.   
                                                 
25 As will become clear later, these price offers are not necessarily identical with the price offers eventually accepted 
or not accepted (e.g., Figure 5), so we call them “initial.” 
26 Price offers in BT are higher than in CT (Mann-Whitney U, two tailed, p < 0.001).   
27 Strictly speaking, 14 offers are below the equal split, but we treat a 9.99 € offer here and elsewhere in the paper as 
equitable.  
  16The history data suggest that those BT-sellers who placed a price offer smaller than the 
equal split were generally less experienced with the use of auctions and start prices.  For instance, 
BT-sellers who chose auction start prices below the equal split in our experiment generally 
placed smaller start prices on eBay than the other sellers who chose the auction format; the 
average start price in our history data is 1.92 €, while the other sellers placed a start price of 7.06 
€ (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = .021).  Also, BT-sellers with offer prices below the equal 
split are somewhat less acquainted with the BIN format, which is the more ‘natural’ choice in 
bilateral bargaining, compared to other sellers; the average proportion of BIN-offers relative to 
all eBay offers in our history data is 4.5 percent compared to 25.8 percent of the other sellers 
(Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = .111).  Finally, we observe that the average feedback score of 
those BT-sellers with price offers below the equal split is 95, much smaller than the 224 of the 
other sellers, and the average number of auctions conducted by those BT-sellers who chose an 
auction start price below the equal split is 4.5, much smaller than the 10.2 of the other sellers, 
though these differences are not significant.  
Offers of below 50 percent are sometimes observed in laboratory games, where the 
specific pattern of behavior suggests they are mostly mistakes rather than attempts to be generous. 
For example, Roth et al. (1991) report data from a very large ultimatum game experiement done 
over four countries (Israel, Japan, Slovenia and the U.S.).  Individual bargainers played the game 
10 times, each time with a different partner.  In the first two rounds of play, 9.3% of the observed 
offers were below 50% of the pie, but by rounds 9 and 10 none of the offers were below 50%.  
This first mover experience effect suggests that the initial offers below 50% were due to 
inexperience rather than preference.   Plausibly, the rate of the these kinds of mistakes is higher in 
the field environment, probably because the seller’s options in the field are more complex, 
effectively a superset of those facing a first mover in a simple lab ultimatum game. 
The overall picture that emerges from combining the field experimental, the historical 
trading and the lab data is that the low price offers are at least partly due to a lack of experience.  
One interesting individual example along this line is a seller, who dealt with the lack of buyer 
competition by shill bidding.  Shill bidding is an illegal attempt by sellers to raise the price by 
bidding oneself or through a confederate.  The seller chose a start price of 1 € and later submitted 
shill bids to increase the final price to 5.50 €.  Why do we suspect shill bidding?  For one, the 
first part of the name of the bidder, who submitted the shill bids, and who was not registered at 
our experiment, is identical with the last name of the seller.  And second, we found four non-
  17experimental auctions on eBay run by our seller, where the same bidder, who submitted the shill 
bids in our experiment, has submitted non-winning bids.  This suggests that the seller employed a 
shilling strategy in our experiment to increase competition that was adapted from his eBay 
experience outside the experiment.
28   
Summing up, we find that with only one exception, sellers do not make use of their 
commitment power as predicted by selfish preferences for BT and CT.  Furthermore, a non-
negligible share of BT-sellers fails to make use of their commitment power as predicted by both 
selfish and social equilibrium.  As expected by social preference theory, auctions are more 
frequently used in CT.  However, for these auctions too, it appears that sellers do not make full 
use of their commitment power, in that the modal offer is a 1 € auction start price, chosen by 58 
percent of the CT-sellers (see the discussion in the next section). 
 
III.2 Buyer behavior in competitive trading 
 























Figure 3 shows the final prices (seller profits) realized in the 29 competitive markets.  
Observe that whenever bidders competed in auctions (the 20 dark bars in Figure 3), the final price 
was above 19 €.  In 14 of these auctions the price was as predicted by equilibrium theory (19.99 € 
or 20 €).  In 5 auctions, prices were in a range between 19.50 € and 19.98 €.  This price range 
                                                 
28 Because all rules of eBay applied in our experiment, we excluded neither the seller nor the bids of the shill bidder 
when computing the final payoffs.  If eBay had closed the auction because of shill bidding (as it happened once in 
our competitive trading environment), the game payoffs to all participants would have been zero, just like on eBay. 
  18describes stable, competitive outcomes of the bidding process, because the minimum bidding 
increment is 0.50 €, implying that no bidder can profitably alter the outcome once the price 
reached this range.  Only in one CT-auction was the final price below 19.50 €, namely 19.09 €.   
The close match between competitive market data and theory is also observed in the laboratory 
(ex., the competitive markets reported in Roth et al. 1991). 
The success of auctions with respect to revenues and the large agreement with prices 
predicted by equilibrium theory – both in standard and in social preference models – is 
remarkable, because seller behavior is largely inconsistent with our hypotheses.  In 15 out of all 
20 auctions, the start price was 1 €, while our null hypothesis suggests 19.99 or 20 €, but it also 
speaks against social preference models.  Social preference theory suggests that a seller may 
choose a low auction price that buyers are willing to accept in order to get competitive bidding 
going.  Since an offer of 1 € is smaller than what is needed to attract bidding (because it would 
give the buyer more than his fair share), and since at the same time low start prices run the risk of 
low revenues via early or late bidding equilibria, sellers seem to give away some control over the 
price discovery process.  In this sense, they do not make full use of their commitment power – 
regardless of whether preferences are selfish or social.
29  As it turns out, however, buyers were 
not able to take advantage of sellers’ low price-offers:  Virtually all buyer payoffs were competed 
away.   
The occurrence of low revenues (the eight light bars in Figure 3) is not the result of failed 
competition.  It is rather due to the corresponding sellers’ choices not to make use of buyer 
competition by offering a BIN price.  All trades that ended with the acceptance of a BIN-offer 
ended with seller profits below 18 €.  There are at least two possible reasons for choosing BIN-
prices below the competitive level.  First, as explained before, fair-minded sellers may be willing 
to leave some money for the buyers.  Second, sellers may underestimate the power of competition 
and believe that a BIN-offer below competitive level may yield higher revenues.  The data do not 
allow separating between these reasons,
30 but there is evidence that some traders underestimated 
the implication of competition for prices.  For one, there were three buyers who rejected the BIN-
offer when the sellers chose the hybrid offer format, and instead submitted a bid which started the 
auction.  In all three cases, the winning buyers later faced a final price that was well-above the 
                                                 
29 Three other sellers choose the equal split as auction start price, which may be interpreted as a ‘fair’ offer to attract 
bidders.  (The other two start prices were 2 € and 3 €.) 
30 For instance, there is no evidence that those CT sellers who used BIN are less experienced, as measured by the 
feedback score. 
  19initially offered BIN-price.  This behavior is inconsistent with both standard and social 
preference theory.  It appears that these buyers wrongly thought that they could get better prices 
in the auction.  Also, the one market that ended with zero payoffs to the seller (Market 1 in Figure 
3) was removed by eBay before the market was supposed to end, because of shill bidding on the 
part of the seller.  As a consequence, all game payoffs were zero.  This seller, too, seemed to have 
underestimated the power and robustness of competition, because (s)he apparently saw a need to 
push competition.   
 
III.3 Buyer behavior in bilateral trading 
 























Figure 4 sorts the final prices (seller profits) in the 46 BT encounters. The average final 
price (seller payoff) is 7.17 €, compared to 17.76 € in CT.  The hypothesis of equal revenues is 
strongly rejected (Mann Whitney U, two-tailed, p < 0.001).  There is also a much wider variance 
in BT final prices.  Eleven encounters ended in zero profits, the maximum seller profit was 17 €.  
None ended close to the 20 € seller profit expected by selfish equilibrium.  
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accepted and not accepted not accepted
 
Figure 5 helps to understand the large variance in final price.  It displays the pattern of 
offers accepted and not accepted in bilateral trading. An offer is defined as accepted when the 
buyer accepted the BIN price or submitted a winning bid in the auction, respectively.  An offer is 
defined as not accepted when neither a BIN-offer is taken nor any valid auction bid is submitted.  
Of course, we do not know for sure why any particular offer was not accepted.  In some cases, it 
might be because a buyer was not available or because (s)he forgot to submit a bid, or a last-
minute bid failed to be successfully submitted.  Thus, after the experiment was completed, we 
asked all BT-buyers to briefly explain their strategy. 
Figures 4 and  5 mix a pattern of behavior common to laboratory observation with a 
pattern rarely seen in laboratories.  Starting with the latter, there are 10 sellers who earn profits 
which lie strictly in between 0 € and the equal split.  This phenomenon is the result of accepted 
price offers in this range, which seem to be partly explained by inexperienced sellers, inept at 
handling the lack of competition (as discussed in section III.1).  Two of these price offers (both at 
1 €) as well as one equal split offer are not accepted, even though they would have yielded high 
absolute respectively equitable payoffs to the buyers.
 31  While rejections of price offers below 
the equal split are sometimes observed also in laboratory research and are not necessarily 
                                                 
31 Because eBay employs second-price auctions, the final price in an auction with only one bidder is equal to the start 
price, regardless of the number of bids and the bid amounts, as long as the highest bid is larger than the start price.  
So, in these cases, even fair-minded buyers could not increase the price in order to get more equitable outcomes.   
  21inconsistent with social utility models,
32 the rejection of the fair offer is not captured by the 
social utility models. In any case, all three buyers told us after the experiment that they actually 
intended to submit a bid but then unfortunately missed eBay’s deadline for bidding.  So, to the 
extent the buyers’ explanation is accurate, not accepting those offers cannot be interpreted as 
“rejections”, but must rather be attributed to the loss of control in our field experiment.  In all 
other cases of non-acceptance, the buyers who responded to our question told us that they did not 
want to submit a bid (two buyers did not respond to our question).   
The rest of the buyer behavior looks pretty much like what has been observed in 
laboratory bargaining experiments, both qualitatively and quantitatively.  Overall, 24 percent 
(11/46) of the offers were not accepted, leading to zero seller and zero buyer payoffs.  If one 
takes into account only offers equal or larger than the equal split, 26 percent (9/34) of the offers 
were not accepted. Furthermore, all ‘greedy’ offers starting at 18 € were not acceptable to buyers.  
There is a significant, negative correlation between the price offer and whether it was accepted 
(Spearman rho = .28, p = 0.060, two-tailed); when we drop those three offers that were 
unintentionally rejected or if we restrict ourselves to offers above the equal split, the correlation 
becomes stronger (rho = .50, p = 0.001, and rho = .379, p = 0.027, respectively).   
In comparison, in the Roth et al. (1991) laboratory ultimatum bargaining game, 26.4% of 
the offers were rejected (there was no significant second mover experience effect), very close to 
what is observed here.  This suggests that the behavior we observe in the bilateral bargaining 
treatment is consistent with the quantitative, as well as qualitative, influence of social preferences 
observed in the laboratory.
33
  The attentive reader may have noticed that the distribution of offers accepted and not 
accepted in Figure 5 is in parts somewhat shifted to the right compared to the distribution of the 
initial price offers in Figure 1.  There are two reasons.  The first reason is shill bidding: one of the 
sellers with an auction start price of 1 € submitted shill bids to increase the price to 5.50 € (see 
section III.1).  So, the initial price offer differed from the final offer eventually accepted by the 
buyer.  The second reason is that in five out of the 18 cases in which BT-sellers selected the 
hybrid selling format (auction with BIN-option), buyers accepted the BIN price even though it 
                                                 
32 Several other experimental studies including Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), Güth et al. (forthcomimg), Gehrig et al. 
(forthcoming), Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2001), Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), Bolton et al. (2006) and Roth et al. 
(1991) report rejections of offers that are advantageous to the buyer.  Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) social utility 
model is consistent with this phenomenon. 
33 Calibrations of social utility functions are presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and  DeBruyn and Bolton (2006).   
  22was higher than the auction start price.
34  Thus, because price offers in Figure 1 are defined as the 
minimum price that can be accepted and Figure 5 only shows offers that are eventually accepted, 
the distributions differ. 
  We suspect that the phenomenon of buyers who take the higher BIN price is partly caused 
by risks of ‘irregular’ bidding in the field, which are controlled away in the laboratory.  The risks 
come from fraudulent shill bidding or from active bidders who are not registered for the 
experiment and just bid for fun or out of curiosity.
35  In fact, we did not only have two rather 
unambiguous cases of shill bidding, but four more eBay users, not registered at our experiment, 
who submitted bids to our experimental offers (none of the bids won).  The BIN offer might 
command a premium to protect the buyer from these risks.  This explanation implies that those 
who took BIN offers would prefer to close the transaction quickly.  In fact, BIN-offers were 
significantly more likely to be accepted earlier than start-price offers as measured in seconds 
before the offer terminates (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.023).
36  
 
III.4 Reputation building behavior 
EBay employs an electronic reputation mechanism that enables buyers and sellers to leave 
feedback (“positive”, “negative”, or “neutral”) on each other after a successful transaction.
37  
Leaving feedback on the trading partner can be an(other) effective way of expressing social 
behavior.  Furthermore, the “reputation” of a trader, that is, the percentage of positives gained in 
non-experimental ‘natural’ transactions, may have predictive value for behavior in our 
experiment.  Here, we investigate both hypotheses. 
A number of field and lab studies show that eBay’s feedback score tends to affect both 
future revenues and probabilities of sale (Dellarocas 2006, Resnick et al. 2006, Bolton et al. 
2004).  Furthermore, some eBay observers inferred from field data that not giving feedback may 
be an indicator of an unsatisfactory transaction.  Dellarocas and Woody (2006), for instance, state 
that their “results confirm the wide-spread belief that eBay traders are substantially more likely to 
post feedback when satisfied than when dissatisfied” (see also Klein et al. 2007).  Part of the 
reason is fear of retaliatory negative feedback: giving negative feedback increases the probability 
                                                 
34 The average difference between BIN and auction start price in these 5 cases is 3.30 €. 
35  We followed a chat room discussion of two eBay bidders, not registered at the experiment, discussing the 
possibility of submitting bids on our auctions just out of curiosity.  
36 It is sometimes argued that buyers prefer BIN-offers when they are impatient.  In our experiment, all subjects were 
paid at the same time after all auctions ended, so in this sense impatience cannot be part of the explanation.   
37 See Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) for an early description and analysis of eBay’s mechanism.  
  23of receiving negative feedback (Bolton et al. 2007).  If our experiment captures natural trading 
patterns, these field observations suggest that we should observe buyers in our bilateral 
bargaining environment to leave positive feedback when their bargaining payoff was high and to 
leave no or negative feedback when the payoff was small.
38  
Overall, we observe that the propensity to give feedback in our experiment is roughly in 
line with Resnick and Zeckhauser's (2002) field observations.  In their huge data set downloaded 
from eBay, buyers commented on sellers for 52 percent of the items (52 percent in our 
experiment), sellers on buyers 61 (73) percent of the time, and 99.1 (98.4) percent of the 
feedback provided by buyers was positive.  
In our BT condition, 11 offers were rejected, so we are left with 35 encounters, where 
feedback could be given.  From these, 16 buyers left no feedback on the respective seller, 18 left 
positive feedback and one left a neutral feedback;
39 25 BT-sellers left feedback.  We find that the 
average buyer payoff when no feedback was given is 9.18 €, while the average payoff when 
positive feedback was given is 11.76 €.  The difference is statistically significant (Mann Whitney 
U test, one-tailed, p = 0.042).  This observation supports the hypothesis in the literature – that 
“silence” correlates with dissatisfaction – in a controlled field environment.  It also shows that 
BT-buyers do not only punish by rejecting but also use the feedback mechanism as a 
reciprocation device.
40  
One might at first glance suspect that a concern for a good reputation is sufficient to 
explain the social behavior we observe in BT.   That is, the prospect of being rewarded with a 
good feedback may be a good incentive for sellers to make a fair offer.  Yet such reputational 
concerns cannot explain the key phenomenon on the buyer side:  Rejections in the BT-treatment 
do not only abolish the buyer’s profit but also make it impossible for buyers to improve their own 
reputation and to spoil the seller’s reputation.   
The way reputation building interacts with trading behavior raises the question whether a 
trader’s reputation information carries information about individual trading inclinations, which in 
turn have predictive value for the trading strategies employed in our experiment.  In particular, 
                                                 
38 Of course, in more complex transaction, satisfaction with a transaction may depend on many dimensions, such as 
quality of the item, quality of communication, shipping time and costs etc.  In our experiment, however, the only 
dimension which can plausibly be the basis of feedback giving is the distribution of pecuniary payoffs. 
39 The neutral one occurred in the bargaining with shill bidding; the buyer left a comment “I suspect shill bidding. 
Otherwise ok.” (translation from German).   
40 In CT, we have 28 encounters in which feedback could have been given.  14 buyers and 21 sellers gave feedback, 
and all feedback was positive.  There is no significant correlation between buyer payoffs and feedback giving.  
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buyers, outside experimental control, and thus are more likely to have lesser eBay reputations. 
However, the effect, if any, can be expected to be small, because unfair offers may not be 
accepted in the first place and traders with relatively low reputations are avoided and probably 
even crowded out.  In fact, the data point to the right direction, but the effect is not quite 
significant at conventional levels.  The average reputation of those who offer the equal split is 
99.8 percent, while the average reputation of those sellers who demand more is 99.6 percent, 
which is however not significant when applying a Mann Whitney U test.  The Spearman rank 
correlation between seller reputation and corresponding price offers yields – 0.205 at a one-tailed 
significance level of 0.086.   
An alternative interpretation of the correlation could be that those who demand more for 
themselves are more experienced, and that more experience implies a higher probability of 
having received a negative feedback, just because more experience implies more completed 
transactions.  In fact, the correlation between reputation and feedback score (as a measure of 
experience) is significantly negative (Spearman rho = – 0.270, one-tailed p = 0.035).  However, 
the average feedback score of those who offer the equal split is 366, while the average score of 
the others is 131: 153 for those who demand more than the equal split, and 95 for those who 
demand less than the equal split (Mann Whitney U test, one-tailed, p = 0.099).  More experience 
may make you more familiar with the strategic incentives, but it may also make you more 
sensible to the concerns of the trading partner.   
We finally ask whether and how buyers’ acceptance behavior is correlated with reputation 
scores.  There are competing null hypotheses.  Are buyers who do not accept an offer in our 
bilateral bargaining environment more or less experienced than accepting buyers?  On the one 
hand, rejecting may be a kind of mistake by inexperienced buyers.  On the other hand, there is 
evidence indicating that those who are experienced with markets may be more fair-minded 
(Henrich et al. 2001).  Measuring experience by the feedback score, there is, however, no 
significant difference in the data.  Do buyers who do not accept have a better or worse 
reputation?  It may be that they are harder to make happy as a buyer (the resulting conflict 
leading to more negative feedback).  Or maybe they behave in a fairer manner as a seller and 
expect the same treatment themselves.  Measuring reputation as the percentage of positive 
feedback (as done by eBay), however, again yields no significant differences in the buyer data. 
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Starting with a seminal paper in 1962, Vernon Smith showed in a series of classroom 
experiments that certain market institutions converge rapidly and robustly to the competitive 
equilibrium.  In particular, it has been shown that the double auction mechanism works with very 
little learning, with incomplete information about other traders’ (induced) costs and valuations, 
and with only a modest number of experienced traders (see also Plott 1982).  Our paper 
complements this line of literature by showing that competitive behavior can be surprisingly 
robust to the noise and various complexities inherent to real world markets. 
The first online auction experiment was conducted by Lucking-Reiley (1999), who tested 
Vickrey’s revenue equivalence theory by auctioning off “Magic game cards” to ‘real’ traders on 
self-engineered Internet auction platforms.  His methodological approach differs from ours in 
several respects.  Most importantly, Lucking-Reiley was willing to give up significant 
experimental control.  As he put it (p. 1078): “My field experiments conduct unconditional tests 
of a theory’s predictions, because I do not observe whether or not the underlying assumptions of 
the theory are true. … Field tests assess the practical predictive power of a theory, since most 
theoretical assumptions in economic models are intrinsically unobservable in practice.”  In 
contrast, in our eBay experiment we took great care to gain control for the critical assumptions of 
the models, because in social preference models institutions matter greatly.  Suppose, e.g., we 
had instead auctioned off Magic Cards on eBay to all interested traders, just as Lucking-Reiley 
did.  Then, understanding prices would require estimating private and common valuation 
components of the Magic Cards, beliefs over the distribution of values, beliefs over the number 
of potential buyers, and risk preferences.  Because there are obviously many degrees of freedom 
for standard bidding models, the residual contribution of social preferences to explaining prices 
can be made almost arbitrarily small.  However, when testing the comparative ‘practical’ 
performance of auction formats, as Lucking-Reiley did, none of these issues seem terribly 
relevant, if only because they can reasonably be taken as constant across treatments.   
List’s (2006) paper bridges lab and field behavior in carefully controlled lab and field gift-
exchange environments, also using real traders in a real (sports card) market.  His data suggest 
that while the laboratory patterns appear to be rather stable against changes in subject pools, 
communication channels, framing and information scenarios, moving from lab markets to field 
markets significantly reduced the influence of social preferences.  However, based on findings 
such as Falk’s (forthcoming) study of charitable giving, List remarks that there may be other 
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complements List’s approach in several respects.  Methodologically, we choose a design that can 
probably be interpreted as being somewhere between List’s comparison of lab and field 
experiments; by gaining control over the degree of competitive pressure, opportunity costs and 
repeated interaction effects, we can study how social behavior in a natural trading environment 
responds to factors, which have been identified as important in laboratory research and social 
preference theory.  Also, our study supports List’s observation that reputational concerns may 
play an important role in market transactions in that they can trigger behavior that is consistent 
with social preferences.  Our BT-traders use their influence on the trading partner’s reputation to 
reward fair and punish relatively unfair behavior, which may have a disciplining effect on sellers.  
However, the reputation effects cannot explain the social behavior we observe on the buyer side 
(as explained in section III.5).  So, our field experiment suggests that the impact of social 
preferences is neither restricted to off-market domains nor to laboratory contexts.  One might 
speculate that this disagreement of the data has something to do with the methodological 
differences and the degree of control inserted in the different studies, with the particular markets 
studied, or with the fact that List studied positive reciprocity, while our work is mainly concerned 
with negative reciprocity (e.g., a buyer can reject if the seller’s price-offer if perceived as 
unfair).
41   
Gneezy and List (2006) investigated social preferences in a field experiment of a labor 
market, which resembles a laboratory gift-exchange game environment.  They found that a higher 
wage was reciprocated by more effort on the part of the employees during the early hours of the 
task – which is in line with what is typically found in the laboratory.  After a few hours, however, 
effort levels in the gift treatment mirrored those in their non-gift treatment.  As a consequence, 
the authors question the idea that experimental results gathered in the span of an hour or two can 
always be used to make inference on tasks that are inherently much longer lived.  They concluded 
from their data: “We interpret our findings as suggesting that great care should be taken before 
making inference from laboratory experiments, which might be deemed as “hot” decision making, 
to field environments, which typically revolve around “cold” decision making.”
42  Our study 
                                                 
41 For the latter argument, observe that experimental results suggest that cooperation in positive reciprocity games, 
such as trust games or public goods games, tend to be less stable (Gneezy and List 2006 for gift exchange games, 
Ledyard 1995 for public good games, Bolton et al. 2004 for trust games), while negative reciprocity tends to be more 
robust (Roth 1995 for ultimatum games, Fehr and Gächter 2000 for public good games with punishment).   
42 Interestingly, Lucking-Reiley’s study also found that differences of duration of laboratory and field interaction 
may have important implications.  He found that Dutch auctions earn approximately 30 percent more revenue than 
  27complements Gneezy and List’s work in at least two respects.  First, we identify social behavior 
in an extremely adverse environment, where interaction is, unlike in labor markets, among 
anonymous traders with no common history or common future, and with relatively restricted 
communication channels and strategic options.  Second, our study speaks to the effect of hot vs. 
cold decision making.  In the jargon of Gneezy and List, the traders in our experiment make 
“cold” decisions.  Sellers had about a week to think about their offer, and buyers typically had a 
week to think about their responses.  Still, we observe strong evidence for social behavior in BT.  
It seems that cold decision making in the sense of having substantially more time to think about 
one’s response to an unfair price offer does not necessarily diminish the tendency to reject.   
There is also a related and fast-growing literature dealing with the economics of the eBay 
market (Bajari and Hortacsu 2004, and Ockenfels et al. 2006 provide surveys).  Most papers in 
this literature test auction theory, both in the uncontrolled field (e.g., Ockenfels and Roth 2006, 
Bajari and Hortacsu 2003) and in the fully controlled laboratory (e.g., Ariely et al. 2005).  Garrat, 
Walker and Wooders (2004) also investigated bidding behavior of actual eBay buyers and eBay 
sellers.  They self-engineered an experimental second-price sealed-bid auction platform on the 
Internet and found that whether or not traders have experience with online auctions affect bidding 
behavior.  A number of papers examine the use of the BIN-option on eBay.  The literature mainly 
focuses on impatience and time preferences (e.g., Mathews 2004) and risk with respect to the 
uncertainty of buyer valuations (e.g., Reynolds and Wooders 2003).  On the other hand, our study 
suggests that risk with respect to ‘irregular’ bidding on the buyer side, underestimating the power 
of competition and social preferences on the seller side may also contribute to the success of 
eBay’s BIN-format.  A few other papers used the actual eBay platform for controlled experiments.  
Jin and Kato (2004, 2005) conducted a field experiment searching for winner’s curse on eBay. 
They bid on eBay auctions for ungraded baseball cards and then let a professional grading service 
evaluate the cards.   
Another related literature deals with eBay’s online feedback system (Dellarocas 2006 
provides a survey).  Here too, one stream of papers uses uncontrolled field data (e.g., Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002), and others brought eBay’s reputation system into the fully controlled 
laboratory (e.g., Bolton et al. 2004).  The paper, which is probably closest to ours, in 
                                                                                                                                                              
first-price auctions, which was inconsistent with previous laboratory studies.  He also observed that his descending-
price auctions took much longer than laboratory experiments and speculated that the higher revenues are because 
bidders might have been impatient to complete their purchase (see Katok and Kwasnica 2005, who found laboratory 
evidence that clock speed matters and a simple model of impatient bidders). 
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(manipulated) differential feedback reputation scores on revenue.  However, none of these online 
market studies investigated the impact of social preferences on bidding and trading behavior, and 
none were conducted to identify trading patterns that connect controlled laboratory and fully 
uncontrolled market behavior.   
 
Many behaviors in our experiment are consistent with the social utility hypothesis.  Yet 
consistency does not necessarily imply that our observations are explained by social preferences.  
One may argue that trading on eBay involves more complicated trade-offs than trading in the 
laboratory.  For instance, our eBay bidders may face higher opportunity costs of time when 
bidding or higher costs associated with winning than bidders in the laboratory, where everybody 
has basically already committed to stay until the end of the experiment and gets paid in cash 
before leaving.  Indeed, if buyers differ with respect to transaction costs associated with bidding 
and winning, the probability that a BT-offer is accepted would decrease with the price-offer, 
because a buyer’s payoff must be larger than the corresponding transaction costs for a trade to 
occur.  At the same time, prices are high in CT if there is a sizeable fraction of bidders in the 
population with negligible transaction costs.   
It is, however, unlikely that transactions costs capture the essence of what we are seeing in 
our experiment.
43  For one, we did everything to minimize transaction costs. There is no shipping 
and handling involved, all payoffs were wired, and all pecuniary transactions costs (eBay and 
bank fees) were paid by the experimenter.  Also, the modal offer is the equal split, which is easily 
explained by a concern for equity on the buyer and/or on the seller side but not by transaction 
costs arguments.  And some buyers who did not accept a small share of the gains from trade 
explicitly told us that they were rejecting an unfair offer or unfair behavior.  The most important 
argument against transaction costs arguments, however, does not come from our field data but 
from lab experiments. Our bargaining patterns mirror those observed in laboratory ultimatum 
games.  Because there are only negligible transaction costs in the laboratory, if at all, the 
laboratory results demonstrate that they are not necessary to produce the bargaining patterns 
observed on eBay – although transaction costs could, of course, reinforce the behavior.  That is, 
laboratory and field experiments produce complementary evidence.  If we had only laboratory 
                                                 
43 There are, of course, other possible complexities.  One hypothesis is that eBay bidders enjoy bidding on eBay 
more than bidding in the laboratory.  But there is no clear evidence for this; no price has ever risen above 20 €, the 
induced pecuniary value.  The same evidence speaks against a utility for winning.  
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may generalize to behavior in more complex, naturally occurring markets.  If we had only the 
field results, one may be inclined to believe that the explanation must lie in the institutional, 
social or motivational complexities that underlie most real world interactions.  Laboratory and 
our field evidence together, however, make for a surprisingly coherent picture.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The data from the field experiment demonstrate that the social preference behavior 
observed under lab conditions, both in quality and in magnitude, extend to experienced traders 
operating in their natural trading system. More specifically, the data confirm the dichotomy 
between equitable bargaining and competitive bidding predicted by social preference equilibrium 
and suggested by laboratory evidence.  Buyers in the bilateral trading environment were prepared 
to reject unfair price offers, and the strength of social preference we observe is quite similar in 
magnitude to what laboratory experiments report.  Buyer competition, on the other hand, robustly 
yielded highly competitive outcomes, dissipating all buyer rents and giving sellers 2.5 times 
higher revenues than without buyer competition.  Also, supporting a hypothesis derived from 
social preference theory not previously tested in either environment, sellers prefer to choose the 
auction format in the competitive trading environment, while they tend to be indifferent between 
available formats in the bilateral trading environment. 
One of the principle lessons the present work has for the vetting of laboratory results in 
the field is the need for experiments that lose control in a controlled way.  The greater complexity 
of the field environment produces a far richer pattern of behavior than observed in the lab.  Some 
of this behavior is an optimal strategic response to the more elaborate rules of the natural market.  
Yet greater complexity also opens the door to increased out-of-equilibrium mistakes, noise and 
malfeasance, so that the underlying reasons for behavior can appear different than they actually 
are – unless the experiment is sufficiently controlled to compare and parse explanations. 
Maybe the most notable out-of-equilibrium phenomenon in our field study is that sellers 
often fail to fully use their commitment power and their information about bidder numbers and 
valuations. In particular, many auction start prices in both trading environments are too low – 
regardless of whether measured by standard or social preference theory.  The out-of-equilibrium 
seller behavior in the field tends to strengthen the dichotomy observed in the laboratory.  Because 
of some very low price offers in the bilateral trading environment, bargaining revenues are even 
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social preferences but is also robust against the increased strategic and cognitive complexities on 
eBay.  There are miscalculations, noise and malfeasance behind otherwise competitive looking 
behavior. 
We also find that the behavior in our controlled field experiment is intertwined with 
uncontrolled field behavior.  A priori experience with eBay predicts and affects our sellers’ 
format choice, the price offer and other trading strategies.  Past trades on eBay also affect the 
sellers’ eBay reputation, which is (weakly) related to the experimental bargaining behavior.  The 
influence also goes in the other direction; behavior in the experiment affects the sellers’ eBay 
reputation, and thus the outcome of future transactions.  Thus, the trading patterns we observe in 
our experiment predict and are predicted by trading patterns employed outside any experimental 
control; they mirror ‘natural’ trading patterns.  While our experimental set-up intervenes in the 
field in various ways, it is exactly this experimental control that allows us to make the connection 
between the controlled laboratory world and the uncontrolled world of economic transactions.   
An important part of social interaction takes place after the price discovery process.  Once 
the price has been determined, the transaction boils down to a bilateral one – independent of the 
degree of buyer competition in the price discovery phase.  In this contracting stage, the seller and 
buyer deal exclusively with one another concerning the non-price terms of the transaction (i.e, 
shipping, quality expectations, etc).  On eBay, this phase ends with a reputation building stage.  
The feedback on the transaction partner given (or not given) on this stage will typically depend 
on overall trading behavior.  While our experiment suppressed all non-price terms, it nevertheless 
demonstrates that this stage is used as an opportunity to bring social concerns into play.  This 
way, preferences and market institutions interact to promote social behavior.   
Our study is open to relatively easy replication, as well as extension in various directions.  
Many of these involve a changing of control or a further loosening of control to check for the 
marginal effects of such factors as incomplete information about values or selling ‘real’ items, 
allowing more social interaction and communication between traders, endogenizing the number 
of traders, etc.  With the emergence of online trading platforms, a highly controlled and flexible 
analysis of field behavior becomes feasible.  
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Instructions sent by email to subjects in BT [Translation from German] 
(Instructions in CT are completely analogous.) 
Subject:  Invitation eBay-Experiment 
To:  (…)  
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear  (…),  
Thank you very much for your registration and your interest in our eBay Project.  Today we offer you to take part in an eBay experiment.  Please 
read this email carefully to the end.  Then decide whether you want to participate or not. 
In the experiment you will either be a seller or a potential buyer of a fictitious good (called “certificate”) on eBay.  Information on your role will 
be sent to you in another email at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
Rules for sellers: 
- The certificate has no intrinsic value.  If the certificate is not sold, the seller will not receive any payoff.  If the certificate is sold, we will transfer 
the final price to the seller’s bank account. 
- The seller ca choose the selling format on eBay (auction, auction with Buy It Now Option, or fixed price (Buy it Now)).  For further information 
on the selling options, go to: http://pages.ebay.de/help/sell/ia/angebotsformate.html  
- All eBay fees including the Listing Fee, the Final Value Fee, the Buy It Now fee, and the Scheduled Listings Fee, will be paid by us, regardless 
of whether the certificate is sold.  We do not refund any expenses for optional features that promote the good, however, such as subtitle, eBay 
Picture Service, or Listing Designer. 
- The offer must start on Monday October 10
th 2005 at 3pm (Scheduled Listings Option) and must not run longer than 10 days.  The category and 
the item description will be determined by us. 
- The seller can post her listing only once.  There will be no second chance to sell the certificate if the first attempt fails.   
- Otherwise, all eBay rules apply. 
- After having posted the listing on eBay, the seller will inform us about the eBay item number.  We will check the offer and verify its compliance 
with our requirements.  Then we will send the web address of the listing to a randomly chosen buyer. 
- Important: There will be only 1 (one) potential buyer for the certificate! 
 
Rules for buyers: 
- The value of the certificate to the buyer is €20.  If the buyer chooses to buy we will transfer €20 minus the price the certificate sold for to the 
buyer’s account.  If the buyer does not to buy, there will be no money transfer. 
- All eBay rules apply.   
- Important: If the payable price exceeds €20, the buyer pays more than the certificate is worth to him or her. In that case the buyer must pay the 
difference to us! (All eBay rules apply; in particular all bids are binding!) 
 
Rules for all participants: 
  36Our payment obligation does only apply to the sellers’ listings that we verified and transferred to a randomly chosen buyer.  Payments will be 
made only if you use the eBay user ID you submitted upon registration.  If you sell or buy a different certificate or use a different eBay user ID, 
you will not receive any money from us! 
  To facilitate the procedure, we will transfer the final price plus all fees to the registered seller, and €20 minus the final price to the 
registered buyer, as soon as the experiment is completed.  You do not have to pay any eBay fees or any fees for the money transfer. 
  If you are interested in taking part in the experiment and are available during the required time (Oct 10
th to Oct.  20
th 2005), please go 
to the following link and sign up; note that with your agreement to participate, you claim to have understood the above mentioned rules and 
conditions and you agree to them. 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/teilnahmefragebogen.php?id=ux_ 
 
Before Friday October 7
th 2005 we will inform you whether you are a seller or a buyer in our experiment. 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
Th nk you!  a
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by the experiment participant system  
If you want to update your information or sign off, please send us an email to the following address: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de  
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de  
 
Subject:  eBay-Beginning of Experiment 
To:  (…)  
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project.  You are a BUYER.  We will randomly select a seller for you and 
will inform you when the offer is posted. This will not be before Monday October 10
th 2005 at 3pm. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  eBay-Beginning of Experiment 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project.  You are a SELLER.  Please create an offer taking into account 
the rules we outlined to you in our previous email.  The listing must be posted in the category: 
Collectibles > Technology & Tools > Science & Medicine > Miscellaneous 
 
The offer must start on October 10
th 2005 at 3pm (Scheduled Listing).  The offer must end at the latest on October 20
th 2005 at 3pm.  Apart from 
that, the duration of the listing can be chosen freely. 
The text in the offer must be: 
 
Item title:  “Certificate …” 
Item description: “Certificate … 
This offer is part of a research project.  The certificate is only of value to you, if you are a chosen participant and if you were informed about the 
item’s ID number by the project manager.  Please do not address any questions to the seller.” 
 
If there are any questions, you can forward them to us.  We will answer them. 
 
Delivery: “No Shipping – item needs to be picked up” 
Shipping: You must not ask for shipping costs. 
 
Please send us the eBay item ID number before October 10
th 2005 at 12pm. 
 
Best Regards, 
Your Experiment Team 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  Your eBay-offer … has been forwarded 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear  (…) 
 
  37Thank you very much for your email. 
Your offer on eBay follows our specifications.  The item ID number has just been forwarded to a randomly chosen buyer 
 
Best Regards, 
Your Experiment Team 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  Your eBay offer … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
  
Please confirm that you received this e-mail by sending a response e-mail to this mailing address.  Thank you. 
 
Hello (…), 
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project. 
Your auction has been posted here: … 
The corresponding eBay auction ID is: … 
The eBay offer started Oct 10
th 2005 at 3pm and ends in 10 days 
You are bidding for the certificate … 
We would like to remind you of the following: 
If you win the certificate at a final price higher than your value of  €20, you have to pay the difference to us.  If you do not place a successful bid, 
you will not receive any payoff.  (All eBay rules apply without exceptions; all bids are binding!) 
 
Thank you! 
Your Experiment Team 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  End of eBay experiment:   … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…) 
Thank you very much for your participation in our eBay experiment 
If you sold the certificate, you will receive the final price plus all eBay fees.  If there was no deal, you will only receive the fees. 
To simplify the payment process WE will do all money transfers, and YOU do not transfer any money.  Please be patient.  For accounting reasons, 
we can only transfer money, when we have received bank account information from all participants. 
 
There are two more things we would like you to do: 
1.  Please go the following link and answer some questions regarding the experiment 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/verkaeuferfragebogen_mx.php?id=ux_  
2.  Please forward the following emails to us that you received from eBay:   “Sold eBay item” email or “eBay item not sold” email.  If you have 
already done so, you do not need to do it again.  We need the information to complete the experiment’s documentation. 
 
We hope you enjoyed our experiment. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team 
PS:  eBay rules apply to the evaluation process also:  participants can evaluate each other (only in the case of successful trades) 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by  
 
Subject:  End of eBay experiment:  … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your participation in our eBay experiment 
If you bought the certificate, you will receive the difference between the final price and your value of €20.  If there was no deal, you will not 
receive any money. 
To simplify the payment process WE will do all money transfers, and YOU do not transfer any money.  Please be patient.  For accounting reasons, 
we can only transfer money, when we have received bank account information from all participants. 
 
There are two more things we would like you to do: 
1.  Please go the following link and answer some questions regarding the experiment 
  38http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/kaeuferfragebogen_mx.php?id=ux_ 
2.  .If you bought a certificate please forward the following email to us that you received from eBay:   “Bought eBay item” email.  If you have 
already done so, you do not need to do it again.  We need the information to complete the experiment’s documentation. 
 
We hope you enjoyed our experiment. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team 
PS:  eBay rules apply to the evaluation process also:  participants can evaluate each other (only in the case of successful trades) 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by … 
 
 
Questionnaire before the start of the experiment 
 
Before registering at our experiment, please read carefully your email and answer the following questions.  
1.  How many potential buyers are there?  
2.  What is the starting time of the offer? 
3.  What is the value of the certificate to the buyer? 
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